Supreme Court “Judicial Servant” Incident Exposes India’s Judicial System Crisis: Colonial Legacies, Administrative Bottlenecks, and the Path to Reform

The judicial architecture of a sovereign republic represents the ultimate guarantor of constitutional morality, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Yet, when the structural and operational frameworks of that system remain anchored in colonial-era hierarchies, administrative sclerosis, and procedural complexity, the delivery of justice is severely compromised. On July 10, 2026, Courtroom 14 of the Supreme Court of India became the site of an unprecedented disruption that laid bare these underlying tensions¹. A litigant-in-person, identified as Prabal Pratap Yadav, disrupted formal proceedings before a two-judge bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Alok Aradhe¹. Dressed in an advocate’s attire and accompanied by co-petitioner Chandra Bhan, Pratap bypassed standard judicial salutations, addressed the presiding bench as “Mr. Judicial Servant,” declared himself “the sovereign,” ordered the court to direct the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) against an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) in Lucknow, and hurled a 185-page bundle of documents into the air before shouting profanities directed at the Chief Justice of India¹.

This dramatic incident, while dismissed on its merits and met with judicial forbearance due to the petitioner’s highly disturbed mental state, serves as a revealing entry point for academic analysis². It is not merely an isolated case of litigant misconduct; rather, it is a symptomatic rupture. The outburst highlights the profound systemic crises afflicting the Indian justice delivery apparatus: the cultural friction between feudal colonial terminology and the constitutional reality of popular sovereignty; the overwhelming psychological and procedural toll of a backlogged case system; the administrative apathy, or “Babugiri,” that characterises both police investigation portals and judicial registries; and the immediate necessity of harmonizing newly enacted procedural laws with access to justice. This article provides a critical analysis of these structural bottlenecks, using the July 10, 2026 incident as a primary case study to chart a path toward holistic judicial and police reform.

Micro-Level Pathologies: Anatomy of Prabal Pratap v. State of Uttar Pradesh

To understand the systemic implications of the Supreme Court incident, it is essential to trace the legal and administrative trajectory that led to Pratap’s courtroom outburst. The case of Prabal Pratap v. The State of Uttar Pradesh did not originate as a high-stakes constitutional dispute but rather as a localized labor and criminal complaint in Lucknow⁴. Pratap, a resident of Bharthana, Etawah, Uttar Pradesh, had previously worked as an associate or practitioner within the local legal ecosystem, having even been listed as counsel in complex criminal revisions before the Allahabad High Court, such as Diwakar Nath Tripathi v. State of U.P., which challenged the rejection of police investigations under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)⁴.

Pratap’s personal legal battle began at Duplex Technologies Services Private Limited, an information technology and software development firm registered in Aliganj, Vikas Nagar, Lucknow⁴. While employed there, Pratap engaged in severe misconduct, including the persistent harassment of a female colleague, which involved sending objectionable and abusive emails⁴. Despite receiving strict warnings from the management, his behavior persisted, leading to his formal termination⁴. In retaliation, Pratap launched a campaign of legal actions against his former employer, fabricating allegations that Duplex Technologies was operating an anti-national cyber-crime and data piracy syndicate across the country⁴.

When local police authorities in Lucknow declined to register an FIR based on these accusations, Pratap sought recourse through the judicial system⁴. He filed an application before the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs) in Lucknow, seeking a direction for police registration of an FIR and investigation under Section 173(4) of the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), the procedural successor to Section 156(3) of the CrPC⁷. On February 21, 2026, the Magistrate declined to order a police investigation, electing instead to convert Pratap’s application into a private complaint case under Section 223 of the BNSS (formerly Section 200 of the CrPC)⁵.

This procedural conversion meant that the burden of adducing evidence shifted entirely to the complainant, preventing the immediate deployment of state investigative machinery¹³. Dissatisfied, Pratap challenged the Magistrate’s order before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lucknow Police Commissioner to take over the investigation and to quash the Magistrate’s order⁵. On April 6, 2026, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, observing that the petitioner possessed an efficacious alternative remedy and should present his facts before the lower court⁵.

Frustrated by these successive procedural roadblocks, Pratap approached the Supreme Court via a Special Leave Petition (SLP), which was registered for listing on June 12, 2026⁶. The ensuing scene on July 10, 2026—characterized by the verbal rejection of judicial hierarchy, the physical throwing of a 185-page document bundle, and targeted profanity—was the culmination of an administrative journey that began in a local police station and wound through multiple tiers of the judiciary¹. While the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on its legal merits and exercised restraint by declining to initiate criminal contempt proceedings due to Pratap’s visible distress, the case highlights how procedural labyrinths can exacerbate litigant frustration, occasionally resulting in institutional disruptions².

Date / Phase	Forum / Institution	Procedural Action	Legal Outcome / Systemic Significance
Pre-Litigation (2025)	Duplex Technologies Services Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow	Disciplinary inquiry and termination of Prabal Pratap.	Fired for persistent harassment of a female colleague; initiated retaliatory litigation alleging a national cyber-crime syndicate4.
November 2025	Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow	Application under Section 173(4) BNSS / 156(3) CrPC7.	Sought judicial directive to compel local police to register an FIR against the employer and Lucknow police officers4.
February 21, 2026	Special Chief Judicial Magistrate (Customs), Lucknow	Conversion of application into a private complaint under Section 223 BNSS5.	Refused to direct police investigation; placed the evidentiary burden on the complainant, stalling immediate state action13.
April 6, 2026	Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)	Writ Petition challenging the Magistrate’s conversion order5.	Petition dismissed; High Court ruled that the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy to pursue the private complaint5.
June 12, 2026	Supreme Court of India Registry	Verification and registration of Special Leave Petition (SLP)6.	Certified as fit to argue in-person by the Judicial Administration registrar under the Supreme Court Rules, 20136.
July 10, 2026	Supreme Court of India (Court No. 14)	Hearing before Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Alok Aradhe1.	Outburst in court; addressal of bench as “judicial servants”1. SLP dismissed on merits; court declined contempt action due to Pratap’s disturbed state3.

This chronological breakdown demonstrates how a localized private dispute can escalate into a high-voltage disruption at the highest level of the judiciary¹. It highlights how litigants can navigate multiple tiers of the court system, driven by personal grievance and enabled by formalistic administrative processes⁶.

Cultural Anachronisms: The Colonial ‘My Lords’ vs. Democratic ‘Judicial Servants’

At the core of Pratap’s courtroom dialogue lies a profound ideological tension that continues to characterize the Indian legal system: the conflict between colonial-era feudalism and modern constitutional democracy. When asked by Justice Viswanathan if he was appearing as a party-in-person, Pratap responded without the customary honorifics, addressing the bench as “Mr. Judicial Servant” and declaring, “I order you to order the registration of FIR… because I am the sovereign”¹.

This exchange illustrates a deep structural contradiction. The preamble to the Constitution of India establishes that sovereign authority originates from “We, the People.” In a constitutional republic, judges, police officers, and civil servants are indeed public servants, deriving their authority from the constitutionally mandated distribution of state power. However, the daily operation of Indian courtrooms remains steeped in the linguistic and physical architecture of British colonial rule, where judges were representatives of the Crown and thus addressed as “My Lords” or “Your Lordships”¹⁵.

This linguistic legacy is not merely a matter of form; it shapes the power dynamics within the courtroom. The persistence of feudal honorifics reinforces an asymmetric relationship between the state’s judicial apparatus and the citizenry, reducing the common masses to what some critically describe as a “cattle class” pleading before lords. Over the past several decades, repeated attempts have been made to dismantle this colonial hierarchy:

• The 2006 BCI Rules: The Bar Council of India (BCI) amended the Rules Governing Advocates under Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act, 1961, introducing Chapter IIIA¹⁸. This amendment explicitly stated that advocates should address the Supreme Court and High Courts as “Your Honour” or “Hon’ble Court,” and subordinate courts as “Sir” or equivalent regional terms, explicitly discouraging “My Lord” and “Your Lordship” as relics of a colonial past¹⁸.
• The 2014 Supreme Court Ruling: In Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, an 85-year-old advocate filed a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking a strict ban on colonial honorifics¹⁷. A bench comprising Justices H.L. Dattu and S.A. Bobde dismissed the petition, ruling that while addressing judges respectfully is mandatory, the use of “My Lord” or “Your Lordship” is not legally compulsory¹⁷. The court noted that “Your Honour” or “Sir” are perfectly acceptable alternatives¹⁷.
• Judicial Resistance and Inconsistency: Despite these regulatory and judicial pronouncements, the transition remains highly inconsistent. In 2020 and 2021, a Supreme Court bench led by Chief Justice S.A. Bobde took exception to a litigant addressing the bench as “Your Honour,” remarking that the term belonged to the Supreme Court of the United States or a subordinate magistrate, thereby prompting the litigant to revert to “My Lords”¹⁹. Conversely, progressive jurists have actively sought to dismantle this practice. For instance, Justice S. Muralidhar during his tenure at the Delhi and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat as Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, formally requested that advocates desist from using feudal salutations in favor of “Sir” or “Hon’ble Court”¹⁷.

Pratap’s subversion of courtroom etiquette, though expressed aggressively, reflects a literal interpretation of constitutional sovereignty¹. By reframing judges as “judicial servants” and positioning himself as the “sovereign litigant,” he challenged the hierarchical theater of the court¹. The systemic failure to fully implement a decolonized courtroom lexicon alienates the common citizen, reinforcing a perception of the judiciary as an inaccessible, elite, and feudal institution rather than a democratic arbiter of rights.

Structural Strain: The Mathematical Realities of Backlog, Vacancies, and the “Square Wheels” Economy

The anger and instability exhibited by litigants like Pratap cannot be separated from the administrative strain of the Indian judicial system. The Indian judiciary is currently grappling with unprecedented structural pressure, characterized by a massive backlog of pending cases, high judicial vacancy rates, and a severely low judge-to-population ratio.

As of late 2025 and early 2026, the cumulative case backlog across all levels of the Indian judiciary has crossed the threshold of 5.5 crore (55 million) pending cases, marking a dramatic escalation from the 3.2 crore backlog recorded in 2015²⁴. Criminal cases constitute approximately 77% of this total backlog²⁴. The physical and emotional exhaustion of navigating this system often drives litigants to extreme frustration.

This backlog is driven by a severe shortage of judicial manpower. As detailed in parliamentary disclosures and the India Justice Report 2025, the actual working judge-to-population ratio in India stands at approximately 15 to 17 judges per million people²⁵. This is far below the target of 50 judges per million recommended by the Law Commission of India in its 120th Report as early as 1987²⁵.

To place India’s judicial capacity in a global context, comparative metrics are presented below:

Metric	India (Sanctioned Strength)	India (Actual Working Strength)	United States	United Kingdom	Europe (Average)
Judges per Million Population	~1927	15 – 1725	100 – 15026	~5030	~140 – 22029
Average Caseload per Judge (Annual)	~2,200 (District)27	~2,600 (Disposals)25	~81 (Disposals)25	–	–
National Judicial Vacancy Rate	–	21% (Subordinate) / 33% (High Courts)27	–	–	–

This table demonstrates the immense burden placed on the Indian judiciary. While an average American judge disposes of approximately 81 cases annually, an Indian judicial officer handles an average of 2,600 disposals per year, working weekends and holidays to manage the caseload²⁵. In high-workload courts, such as the Allahabad High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the individual caseload reaches up to 15,000 cases per judge²⁷.

This structural bottleneck is further exacerbated by chronic vacancies. Nationally, High Courts operate with a 33% vacancy rate, and the district judiciary faces a 21% vacancy rate²⁷. This deficit is highly concentrated in northern and eastern states. For instance, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal alone account for approximately 31% of the national case backlog²⁴. Research shows a strong positive correlation of 0.87 between high judicial vacancies and case pendency in northern states, illustrating that the administrative system is unable to keep pace with the demands of an increasingly litigious and urbanizing population²⁴.

This situation leads to what economic analysts term a “square wheels situation”²⁴. While India seeks to drive forward high-stakes public investments and market-led growth, its administrative and dispute-resolution institutions are forced to rely on slow, ill-fitting governance mechanisms²⁴. This friction increases transaction costs, delays contract enforcement, and places immense psychological pressure on litigants, occasionally resulting in emotional breakdowns within the courtroom¹.

Administrative “Babugiri”: Registry Inertia and the Hurdles of Police Bureaucracy under the BNSS

While numerical deficits explain the delays, the everyday experience of litigation is defined by bureaucratic apathy, commonly referred to as “Babugiri.” This administrative inertia operates in two primary arenas: the internal judicial registry and the police-procedural framework governing criminal investigations.

Registry Failures and Checklist Bureaucracy

The Supreme Court incident of July 10, 2026, exposes a critical failure in the judicial branch’s internal administrative machinery⁶. Under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, any litigant wishing to appear and argue as a party-in-person must undergo a mandatory interaction with a registrar in the Judicial Administration branch⁶. The registrar’s legal duty is to evaluate the litigant’s capacity, verify that they can assist the court in a proper manner, and formally certify them as fit to argue⁶.

In Pratap’s case, the registrar had formally interacted with him and issued a certificate stating, “I am of the opinion that he is able to give assistance in a proper manner”⁶. Yet, upon standing before the bench, Pratap exhibited incoherent and highly erratic behavior⁶. When the bench summoned the concerned registrar to explain how an obviously disturbed individual had been certified as fit, the official stood “clueless” in open court⁶.

This incident reveals a broader systemic pattern: the reliance of judicial administration on formal, checklist-driven compliance rather than substantive evaluation. Registrars and court clerks often treat interaction procedures as a routine exercise, failing to assess the actual psychological readiness or legal competence of self-represented litigants. This bureaucratic detachment compromises courtroom safety and places a heavy burden on presiding judges, who must manage volatile situations in real time⁶.

The Procedural Labyrinth of the BNSS and Police “Burking”

Beyond the registry, the most challenging administrative bottleneck for citizens is the registration of an FIR. In India, police officers frequently engage in “burking”—the practice of refusing to register FIRs for cognizable offenses to keep reported crime statistics low or due to corruption and administrative apathy³¹. To counter this, victims historically relied on Section 156(3) of the CrPC, which empowered magistrates to direct the police to register an FIR and conduct an investigation¹².

However, the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) has altered this procedural landscape, introducing several administrative hurdles:

Procedural Stage / Concept	Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973	Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023	Systemic Impact & Bottlenecks
FIR Registration (Cognizable Offence)	Mandatory under Section 154(1) as per the Lalita Kumari precedent14.	Discretionary preliminary inquiry under Section 173(3)34.	Authorizes a 14-day delay for offenses punishable by 3 to 7 years, creating a loophole for police inaction34.
Magisterial Investigation Orders	Discretionary under Section 156(3) upon finding a cognizable offense12.	Regulated under Section 175(3), codifying the Priyanka Srivastava requirements12.	Mandates a prior application to the SP under Sec 173(4) and a sworn affidavit, limiting immediate judicial relief12.
Public Servant Protections	Handled through separate judicial sanctions and administrative guidelines33.	Codified pre-cognizance hearing/report under Section 175(4)40.	Mandates a report from superior officers and consideration of the public servant’s defense, slowing down accountability39.

These statutory changes present a double-edged sword for the administration of justice:

1. The Preliminary Inquiry Loophole: Under Section 173(3) of the BNSS, an officer-in-charge of a police station, with prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, may defer FIR registration and conduct a “preliminary inquiry” for up to 14 days for offenses punishable by 3 to 7 years of imprisonment³⁴. While designed to filter out frivolous complaints, this provision significantly dilutes the landmark ruling in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., which mandated the immediate registration of an FIR upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offense³¹. It gives police officers statutory discretion to delay proceedings, leaving citizens in a state of uncertainty³⁶.
2. The Magisterial Bottleneck under Section 175(3): Under the old CrPC, if the police refused to file an FIR, a citizen could immediately petition a magistrate under Section 156(3)¹². Under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, this process is strictly regulated¹². The law now codifies the stringent requirements established in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P.³³. A complainant must first prove they approached the station house officer under Section 173(1) and subsequently the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4)³³. Any application to the magistrate must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit and copies of these prior applications¹². Furthermore, the magistrate is required to consider the police officer’s submissions regarding why they declined to register the case before issuing an investigation order¹².
3. Implications for the Litigant: While these safeguards are highly effective at preventing vexatious litigation and blackmail—as seen in commercial disputes and retaliatory filings—they create significant barriers for genuine, economically marginalized victims¹⁴. The requirement to navigate multiple tiers of police hierarchy, draft detailed affidavits, and undergo magisterial inquiries before an investigation even begins creates a procedural hurdle³³.

Pratap’s case is a prime example of this procedural tension. When the Lucknow Magistrate converted his Section 173(4) application into a private complaint under Section 223, the court acted in accordance with judicial directives to prevent the abuse of state machinery for personal vendettas⁴. However, to an increasingly desperate litigant, this procedural transition appeared as a form of institutional collusion and administrative apathy, ultimately contributing to his courtroom outburst¹.

Strategic Reform Framework: Restructuring, Decolonization, and Technological Integration

The compounding crises of the Indian judicial system demand a comprehensive structural reform program. The Supreme Court incident of July 10, 2026, must not be dismissed as a minor security breach; it should be recognized as a call to overhaul the administrative and cultural foundation of the nation’s justice apparatus¹. This framework must address four key pillars: structural capacity, procedural refinement, cultural decolonization, and technological integration.

Structural Capacity Expansion

The primary bottleneck of the Indian judiciary remains its severe shortage of personnel²⁵. The understaffed bench cannot meet the needs of a nation of 1.4 billion people²⁷.

To address this, the Union government must establish the All India Judicial Service (AIJS) under Article 312 of the Constitution²⁸. Recruiting district judges through a centralized, competitive process will attract high-caliber legal talent, standardize judicial training, and ensure a steady pipeline to fill the 21% vacancy rate in the subordinate judiciary²⁷.

Simultaneously, the Supreme Court Collegium and the Ministry of Law and Justice must adopt a strict, time-bound schedule to eliminate the 33% vacancy rate in High Courts, ensuring that judicial recommendations are made and cleared at least six months before a vacancy arises²⁷. This must be accompanied by the establishment of the National Judicial Infrastructure Authority of India (NJIAI) to provide subordinate courts with the physical and digital facilities required for efficient case management²⁶.

Cultural Decolonization and Litigant Support

Decolonizing the courtroom requires reforming both language and administrative practices. The Bar Council of India, in coordination with the judiciary, must enforce a transition from colonial honorifics like “My Lord” and “Your Lordship” to democratic salutations such as “Your Honour” or “Hon’ble Court,” aligning the courtroom experience with constitutional equality¹⁸.

Furthermore, registries must overhaul their approach to self-represented litigants⁶. Rather than relying on simple, checklist-driven approvals, registries should establish dedicated Litigant-in-Person Support Cells staffed by legal aid counsel and psychological professionals². These cells would help vulnerable or distressed litigants navigate the court system, reducing procedural errors and lowering the risk of volatile outbursts in the courtroom².

Procedural Calibration of the BNSS

The procedural rules introduced by the BNSS must be balanced to ensure they do not hinder access to justice. While the safeguards under Sections 173(3) and 175(3) are useful for preventing frivolous or retaliatory cases, they must not be allowed to shield police inaction or create insurmountable barriers for genuine victims¹².

The 14-day limit for preliminary inquiries under Section 173(3) must be strictly enforced through real-time digital portals³⁶. If an inquiry is not completed within this timeframe, it should automatically trigger a deemed FIR and initiate disciplinary action against the delinquent officer³⁶.

Furthermore, Section 175(3) should be amended to give magistrates the discretion to waive strict procedural requirements—such as prior written filings with the Superintendent of Police—in urgent cases involving human rights violations, gender-based violence, or extreme socioeconomic vulnerability, ensuring the court remains an accessible avenue for relief¹².

Technological Integration and Responsible AI

Technology must be leveraged to improve efficiency across all tiers of the judiciary. The implementation of Phase III of the e-Courts Mission Mode Project should focus on digitizing all subordinate court records and establishing virtual hearing facilities in remote areas³⁰.

Furthermore, the judiciary should institutionalize artificial intelligence tools under strict ethical guidelines⁴⁷. Tools like the Supreme Court Portal for Assistance in Court Efficiency (SUPACE) can assist judges by summarizing extensive case files and identifying relevant precedents, while the Supreme Court Vidhik Anuvaad Software (SUVAS) can translate judgments into regional languages, improving accessibility in a multilingual society⁴⁷.

To manage the heavy case backlog, AI-driven case-flow systems can categorize incoming matters by urgency and complexity, routing routine cases to digital summary courts and allowing human judges to focus on complex trials²⁸.

┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                       Systemic Judicial Reform Program                    │
└─────────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                                      │
         ┌────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────┐
         ▼                            ▼                            ▼
┌──────────────────┐         ┌──────────────────┐         ┌──────────────────┐
│    Structural    │         │    Procedural    │         │     Cultural     │
├──────────────────┤         ├──────────────────┤         ├──────────────────┤
│ • Establish AIJS │         │ • Strictly limit │         │ • Abolish feudal │
│   to resolve the │         │   preliminary    │         │   honorifics like│
│   21% subordinate│         │   inquiries to a │         │   “My Lords” in  │
│   vacancy rate   │         │   maximum of 14  │         │   favor of “Your │
│   [cite: 27, 28].│         │   days [cite: 37]│         │   Honour” [cite: │
│                  │         │                  │         │   75, 76].       │
│ • Empower the    │         │ • Give           │         │                  │
│   NJIAI to       │         │   magistrates    │         │ • Overhaul       │
│   modernize physical│      │   discretion to  │         │   registries and │
│   infrastructure │         │   waive strict   │         │   establish      │
│  .│         │   affidavit      │         │   Litigant-in-   │
│                  │         │   barriers in    │         │   Person Support │
│ • Complete High  │         │   urgent cases   │         │   Cells to assist│
│   Court vacancies│         │  .│         │   distressed     │
│   within 90 days │         │                  │         │   petitioners    │
│   [cite: 27, 28].│         │                  │         │  .     │
└──────────────────┘         └──────────────────┘         └──────────────────┘

This structural reform program addresses the root causes of judicial delay and litigant frustration, providing a clear roadmap toward a more efficient, accessible, and democratic justice system²⁸.

Toward a Sovereign-Centric Administration of Justice

The Supreme Court incident of July 10, 2026, was a symptom of a judicial system under severe strain. When a citizen enters the highest court of the land, rejects its traditional hierarchy, and declares himself the sovereign, he exposes a deep-seated gap between the promise of constitutional democracy and the reality of a hierarchical, colonial legal system.

This systemic crisis is further compounded by a shortage of judicial manpower, resulting in a backlog of over five crore pending cases²⁴. Under these conditions, the pursuit of justice can become a long and exhausting process for litigants, as seen in the volatile shoe-hurling incident of 2025 and Prabal Pratap’s courtroom disruption in 2026¹. This frustration is exacerbated by administrative hurdles, such as the procedural barriers under Sections 173(3) and 175(3) of the BNSS, which can sometimes make the simple registration of an FIR feel like an insurmountable task¹².

To build a more equitable legal system, India must move away from the colonial traditions of the past and embrace a more citizen-centric approach to justice. This requires a comprehensive effort to decolonize courtroom language, fill judicial vacancies, and implement key administrative reforms¹⁸. By simplifying procedural laws, establishing the All India Judicial Service, and integrating modern AI tools, the state can make its courts more accessible, transparent, and efficient²⁸. Only by addressing these foundational issues can the Indian judiciary truly honor its constitutional mandate and ensure that “We, the People” remain the true sovereigns of the republic.

Works cited

1. “I am the Sovereign”: Litigant escorted out of Supreme Court after hurling file papers, curses at judges, https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/i-am-the-sovereign-litigant-escorted-out-of-supreme-court-after-hurling-file-papers-curses-at-judges20260710210253
2. We Only Have Sympathies for Him Supreme Court Declines Action After Litigant Hurls Papers Abuses CJI During Hearing – LawStreet Journal, https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/we-only-have-sympathies-for-him-supreme-court-declines-action-after-litigant-hurls-papers-abuses-cji-during-hearing
3. Mr judicial servant, I order you…: Man flings papers, abuses inside SC courtroom, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/law-news/story/supreme-court-complainanat-abuse-removed-after-alleged-abuse-during-allahabad-high-court-hearing-2944891-2026-07-10
4. कौन हैं सुप्रीम कोर्ट में वकील के भेष में जज पर पेपर उछालने वाले प्रबल प्रताप? लड़की के कारण गई थी नौकरी, https://www.aajtak.in/education/news/story/prabal-pratap-yadav-supreme-court-paper-throwing-incident-edmm-rptc-2598932-2026-07-11
5. Petitioner hurls papers, ‘orders’ SC to file FIR, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/petitioner-hurls-papers-orders-sc-to-file-fir/articleshow/132323331.cms
6. CJI abused, papers thrown: Behind the ruckus in Supreme Court by Lucknow man, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/cji-abused-papers-thrown-behind-the-ruckus-in-supreme-court-by-lucknow-man-101783709274836.html
7. Supreme Court Dismisses Plea After Petitioner Throws Papers At Bench; Justice KV Viswanathan Says ‘We Only Have Sympathies’ – LawBeat, https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-dismisses-plea-after-petitioner-throws-papers-at-bench-justice-kv-viswanathan-says-we-only-have-sympathies-1610918
8. Supreme Court Dismisses Plea After Petitioner Throws Papers At Bench; Justice KV Viswanathan Says ‘We Only Have Sympathies’ – LawBeat, https://lawbeat.in/amp/top-stories/supreme-court-dismisses-plea-after-petitioner-throws-papers-at-bench-justice-kv-viswanathan-says-we-only-have-sympathies-1610918
9. Court No. 67 A.F.R. Judgement Reserved on 23.05.2025 Judgement Delivered on 07.07.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHA – Verdictum, https://www.verdictum.in/pdf_upload/diwakar-nath-tripathi-v-state-of-upwatermark-1727317.pdf
10. DUPLEX TECHNOLOGIES SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED – 2026 Company Profile & Financials – Tracxn, https://tracxn.com/d/legal-entities/india/duplex-technologies-services-private-limited/__gP2igg1s5HB5iz-byyJO7D4Khi9Why-eYQ27_vcdToo
11. Duplex Technologies Services Pvt Ltd: Best Software and Mobile apps Development Company in Lucknow – ERP, CRM, Website Design – magicpin, https://magicpin.in/Lucknow/Vikas-Nagar/Other/Duplex-Technologies-Services-Pvt-Ltd:-Best-Software-And-Mobile-Apps-Development-Company-In-Lucknow-Erp,-Crm,-Website-Design/store/22455c7
12. Fahimuddin Ansari vs State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Home Lko. And … on 7 April, 2026, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91311163/
13. 18.12.2025 Judgment pronounced on – High Court of Delhi, https://delhihighcourt.nic.in/app/showFileJudgment/SKS18032026CRLMM25512025_181233.pdf
14. Private Complaints In Bnss: Empowering Citizens Or Overloading Courts? – Zenodo, https://zenodo.org/records/15312121/files/1.Animesh%20Pareek%201-10.pdf?download=1
15. Colonial Policy And Administration – Hansard – UK Parliament, https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/1949-04-13/debates/a5cba5d1-6137-4be3-ba19-0160fe296659/ColonialPolicyAndAdministration
16. Colonial Policy – Hansard – UK Parliament, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1942-12-03/debates/54600e72-1834-47ca-96a5-1b6de942ffc1/ColonialPolicy
17. Calling judges ‘lord’, ‘lordship’, ‘your honour’ not mandatory: Supreme Court – NDTV, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/calling-judges-lord-lordship-your-honour-not-mandatory-supreme-court-546975
18. No My Lords, Your Lordships at Rajasthan High Court from now on, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/jul/15/no-my-lords-your-lordships-at-rajasthan-high-court-from-now-on-2004251.html?botrequest=true
19. Addressing Judges in Indian Courts | PDF | Supreme Court Of India – Scribd, https://www.scribd.com/document/513361258/ADDRESSING-THE-JUDGES-write-up
20. How to address judges? ‘My Lord’? ‘Your Honour’? Here’s what SC says – The Federal, https://thefederal.com/news/whats-the-correct-way-to-address-judges-my-lord-your-honour
21. “Milaard aur memberane jury”: The ‘Your Honour’ controversy – Bar and Bench, https://www.barandbench.com/columns/milaard-aur-memberane-jury-the-your-honour-controversy
22. BCI clarifies on CJI’s objection to use of ‘Your Honor’ to address the Top Court; cites Resolution regarding it – The Legal Code, https://thelegalcode.quora.com/BCI-clarifies-on-CJIs-objection-to-use-of-Your-Honor-to-address-the-Top-Court-cites-Resolution-regarding-it
23. ‘Ye de dena… CJI ko’: Drama in Supreme Court as petitioner uses cuss words, ‘orders’ bench to take action, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/cji-br-gavai-i-am-sovereign-petitioner-orders-supreme-court-while-arguing-case-flings-papers-judges-101783680728855.html
24. The Weak Visible Hand Behind India’s Market-Led Growth | Department of Land Economy, https://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/node/7321
25. Don’t Blame The Judges – LiveLaw, https://www.livelaw.in/law-firms/dont-blame-the-judges-539028
26. [Solved] As per India Justice Report 2025, how many judges does India – Testbook, https://testbook.com/question-answer/as-per-india-justice-report-2025-how-many-judges–68e53e29e4037fba938247ee
27. 2025 India Justice Report: Only 15 Judges Per Million Population; 38% Of Judges In District Judiciary Are Women – ETV Bharat, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!bharat/2025-india-justice-report-only-15-judges-per-million-population-38-percent-of-judges-in-district-judiciary-are-women-enn25041506047
28. Rising Judicial Pendency in India – Drishti IAS, https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/rising-judicial-pendency-in-india
29. ‘India has only 15 judges per million population’ – MillenniumPost, https://www.millenniumpost.in/big-stories/india-has-only-15-judges-per-million-population-606743
30. India Has 22 Judges per Million—And 5 Crore Pending Cases! – SPOINDIA, https://spoindia.org/news/India-Has-22-Judges-per-Million%E2%80%94And-5-Crore-Pending-Cases!
31. From Lalita Kumari to Section 173(3) BNSS: FIR Registration, Police Discretion, and the Constitution after the BNSS – Law School Policy Review, https://lawschoolpolicyreview.com/2026/03/22/from-lalita-kumari-to-section-1733-bnss-fir-registration-police-discretion-and-the-constitution-after-the-bnss/
32. Magistrate’s Power to Order an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC – Supreme Court Observer, https://www.scobserver.in/supreme-court-observer-law-reports-scolr/sadiq-b-hanchinmani-v-state-of-karnatakamagistrates-power-to-order-an-fir-under-section-1563-crpc/
33. Magistrate’s Power to Order Investigation under Section 175(3) of the BNSS: From Judicial Discretion to Procedural Rigidity – RGNUL Student Research Review, https://www.rsrr.in/post/magistrate-s-power-to-order-investigation-under-section-175-3-of-the-bnss-from-judicial-discretion
34. SC refuses contempt proceedings against litigant who verbally abused CJI, threw papers in courtroom – Scroll.in, https://scroll.in/latest/1094202/sc-refuses-contempt-proceedings-against-litigant-who-verbally-abused-cji-threw-papers-in-courtroom
35. Preliminary Enquiry Under Section 173(3) Of The BNSS — The Supreme Court Solves The Riddle – LiveLaw, https://www.livelaw.in/articles/supreme-court-judgment-imran-pratapgadhi-vs-state-of-gujarat-explains-preliminary-inquiry-section-173-bnss-287964
36. critical analysis of section 173 of bnss – INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL AFFAIRS AND EXPLORATION, https://ijlae.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/CRITICAL-ANALYSIS-OF-SECTION-173-OF-BNSS-By-Chandra-Mauli-Mishra.pdf
37. No.D1-41943/2026/PHQ Police Headquarters, Thiruvananthapuram Vazhuthacaud Pincode:695010 phq.pol@kerala.gov.in 04712721547 Dated, https://keralapolice.gov.in/storage/orders/iaps/e2d975c52bcc30cb6e0f2bccf76f1252.pdf
38. Dinesh Kumar Mishr @ Dinesh Mishr And 7 … vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home … on 18 May, 2026 – Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/181272217/
39. Section 156 (3) of CrPC v. Section 175 (3) of BNSS – Drishti Judiciary, https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/current-affairs/section-156-3-of-crpc-v-section-175-3-of-bnss
40. Section 156(3) CrPC vs. S.175(3) BNSS | BNSS Requires Magistrate to Hear Police Officer Before Rejecting FIR Registration, Ensuring a Reasoned Order: Supreme Court – Legalspace.ai, https://legalspace.ai/news/section156-crpc-vs-s175-bnss-bnss-requires-magistrate-to-hear-police-officer-before-rejecting-fir-registration-ensuring-a-reasoned-order-supreme-court
41. Section 175 in Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25110765/
42. Scope of Section 175(4) under BNSS, 2023 – Supreme Court Observer, https://www.scobserver.in/supreme-court-observer-law-reports-scolr/scope-of-section-1754-under-bnss-2023/
43. Section 156(3) CrPC & 175(3) BNSS: SC Limits on FIR Orders – King Stubb & Kasiva, https://ksandk.com/corporate/section-1563-crpc-1753-bnss-sc-magistrates/
44. Supreme Court Bar Association Seeks Guidelines On Courtroom Videos After Supreme Court Outburst – LawBeat, https://lawbeat.in/amp/top-stories/supreme-court-bar-association-seeks-guidelines-on-courtroom-videos-after-supreme-court-outburst-1611248
45. SOP for Zero FIR – e-FIR and Preliminary Enquiry under BNSS – Puducherry Police, https://police.py.gov.in/SOP%20for%20Zero%20FIR%20-%20e-FIR%20and%20Preliminary%20Enquiry%20under%20BNSS.pdf
46. A legal study on minimum cases pendency in our judicial system by ULSI techniques – RJ Wave, https://www.rjwave.org/jaafr/papers/JAAFR2606154.pdf
47. AI in Judiciary: Need, Benefits, Ethical Concerns & Challenges – PMF IAS, https://www.pmfias.com/ai-in-judiciary/